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I.

INTRODUCTION

The year 2017 marked the centennial of the collective naturalization
of Puerto Ricans under the terms of the Jones Act of 1917. 1 Prevailing
debates over the Jones Act seem to hover around two myths. A prevailing
narrative argues that the Jones Act of 1917 was the first law to grant Puerto
Ricans United States (U.S.) citizenship. In addition, too many writers
claim, without offering any historical evidence, that the Congress used the
citizenship provision of the Jones Act “as a vehicle for drafting Puerto
Rican men into the U.S. military” and World War I more generally. 2 Both
claims are incorrect.
Associate Professor with a joint appointment in the Department of Political Science and
El Instituto, University of Connecticut; Ph.D. University of Massachusetts. As always, I
would like to thank Sheila I. Velez, Blanca Silvestrini José Javier Colón Morera for their
continued thoughtfulness, encouragement and support.
1
48 U.S.C.S. § 731 (LexisNexis); see generally José A. Cabranes, Citizenship and the
American Empire, Notes on the Legislative History of the United States Citizenship of
Puerto Ricans (1979) (for an overview of the legal history of the Jones Act citizenship
provision).
2
Nelson A. Denis, War Against All Puerto Ricans, Revolution and Terror in America’s
Colony 139 (2015); but see Harry Franqui-Rivera, Why Puerto Ricans Did Not Receive
Citizenship
So
They
Could
Fight
in
WWI
(Dec.
31,
2017,
∗
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Drawing on Derrick Bell’s notion of interest convergence 3, this note
argues that white elites in the United States decided to grant Puerto Ricans
U.S. citizenship more than a decade before the enactment of the Jones Act
and that this decision was motivated by more interests than recruiting
cannon fodder for World War I. Central to my argument is that at the time,
Congress, the author of the citizenship legislation for Puerto Rico, was a
plural and complex institution comprised of white elites. Congress enacted
legislation extending citizenship to Puerto Ricans because of some
altruistic sense, but rather because the interests of white elites converged
in particular moments in time. This note is divided in three parts. Part I
provides a summary of Derrick Bell’s notion of interest convergence. The
idea is to frame the parameters of Bell’s thesis. Part II contextualizes the
case of Puerto Rico through overviews of the island’s territorial status and
the history of the extension of U.S. citizenship to Puerto Ricans. Part III
explains how Bell’s notion of interest convergence can help expand the
debates over the intent of the enactment of the Jones Act beyond a
parsimonious focus on the military interests of the United States empire.
My goal is to open the door for more serious research of the history of the
extension of U.S. citizenship to Puerto Rico.

II. DERRICK BELL’S NOTION OF INTEREST CONVERGENCE
Derrick A. Bell Jr.’s use of the notion of interest convergence to
criticize some of the liberal responses to the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Brown v. Board of Education 4 stands as a pillar for LatCrit theory, as well
as other critical approaches to U.S. law. 5 Central to Bell’s argument is a
critique of the depoliticizing interpretation of the Court’s ruling in Brown
adopted by liberal legal actors and scholars, interpretations that shifted the
focus away from the social justice concerns raised by racist inequalities to
questions about the desire of black Americans to acquire rights to associate
with whites and the “neutrality” of the Court’s reasoning. Bell contended
“that the decision in Brown to break with the Court’s long-held position
on these issues cannot be understood without some consideration of the
decision’s value to whites, not simply those concerned about the
immorality of racial inequality, but also those whites in policymaking
positions able to see the economic and political advances at home and
https://centropr.hunter.cuny.edu/centrovoices/chronicles/why-puerto-ricans-did-notreceive-us-citizenship-so-they-could-fight-wwi.
3
See generally, Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980).
4
See generally, Brown v. Bd of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5
See Bell Jr., supra note 3.
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abroad that would follow abandonment of segregation.” 6 Bell’s definition
of interest convergence was anchored on three arguments.
First, Bell argued, “the decision helped to provide immediate
credibility to America’s struggle with Communist countries to win the
hearts and minds of emerging third world peoples.” 7 At the height of the
Cold War, the United States propaganda machine sought to discredit
Communist countries as totalitarian regimes that oppressed their subjects.
Racist inequalities and Jim Crow laws reproduced the image that the
United States capitalist government was also a totalitarian regime, a
regime that tolerated the unequal treatment of its citizens. For Bell, the
narrative of United States international credibility was premised on
affirming the motto “all men are created equal,” a motto that was
undermined by racist inequalities and Jim Crow laws 8.
Second, Bell continued, “Brown offered much needed reassurance to
American blacks that the precepts of equality and freedom so heralded
during World War II might yet be given meaning at home.” 9 Accordingly,
if whites expected black soldiers to die in foreign campaigns for the
principles of “equality and freedom,” the United States needed to promote
these principles at home. Veterans returning from foreign or international
campaigns needed reassurance that they were fighting and dying for
principles that they could live by at home. More importantly, by
addressing inequalities at home, whites could discourage the involvement
of black veterans in domestic protests.
Third, Bell concluded, “there were whites who realized that the south
could make the transition from a rural, plantation society to the sunbelt
with all its potential and profit only when it ended its struggle to remain
divided by state-sponsored segregation.” 10 Bell argued that some whites
viewed Jim Crow laws as an obstacle to the industrialization of southern
states. For some white elites, segregation undermined the United States’
economic and commercial potential. In other words, segregation was bad
for business.

III. CONTEXTUALIZING THE PUERTO RICAN EXAMPLE
Part of the challenge of applying Bell’s notion of interest convergence
to Puerto Rico, and unincorporated territories more generally, is
Id. at 524.
Id.
8
See generally Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age
of Colorblindness (2012) (for an analysis of how the vestiges of Jim Crow laws are still
prevalent in modern-day American society).
9
See Bell Jr., supra note 3 at 524.
10
Id. at 525.
6
7
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contextualizing the relationship among the U.S. empire, the constitutional
status of Puerto Rico and the citizenship status of Puerto Ricans. Bell’s
critique sought to explain the status of black citizens who acquired a 14th
Amendment citizenship as a result of their birth in the United States and
who further resided in the United States. In contrast, unincorporated
territories like Puerto Rico are selectively ruled as foreign possession in a
domestic or constitutional sense. They are selectively ruled as separate and
unequal parts of the United States. Moreover, historically, Congress has
enacted a wide array of citizenship statutes extending different types of
citizenships to Puerto Rico and the other territories. 11 To be sure, at times
some of these citizenship statutes have treated Puerto Rico as a foreign
territorial possession and others have treated the island as a part of the
United States. But let me explain.

IV. PUERTO RICO’S CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS
Between 1898 and 1901, the United States invented a new territorial
law and policy to govern Puerto Rico and the other territories annexed in
the aftermath of the Spanish-American War of 1898. The Department of
War invented a new territorial status, Congress normalized it in 1900, and
the Supreme Court institutionalized it in 1901. As I have explained
elsewhere, the new territorial law and policy both departed from and
combined elements of prior colonialist and imperialist traditions of U.S.
territorial expansionism in important ways. 12 All territories annexed by the
United States since 1898 have been governed under the terms of the new
territorial law and policy.
To be sure, the United States government simultaneously developed
two traditions of territorial expansionism between the founding and 1898,
namely the colonialist and imperialist traditions. United States colonialist
expansionism was premised on the annexation of territories that could be
settled by U.S. citizens, subsequently organized, and eventually admitted
as states into the Union. 13 Colonized territories were governed as

See generally, ARNOLD H. LEIBOWITZ, DEFINING STATUS: A COMPREHENSIVE
ANALYSIS OF U.S. TERRITORIAL POLICY 144-145 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2d ed.
2014); see generally Charles R. Venator-Santiago, Territorial Citizenship Today: Four
Interpretations, 50 PS: Political Science and Politics, 515, 515-519 (2017) (for an analysis
of four of the interpretations of the status of people born in unincorporated territories which
are currently up for debate).
12
See generally CHARLES R. VENATOR-SANTIAGO, PUERTO RICO AND THE ORIGINS OF
U.S. GLOBAL EMPIRE: THE DISEMBODIED SHADE, 1 (Denise Ferrerira da Silva et.al, 1st ed.
2015).
13
See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 448 (1857).
11
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constitutional parts of the United States. 14 In contrast, the imperialist
tradition was premised on the strategic occupation of territories for
military and/or economic purposes. Territories subject to imperialist
occupation were ruled as foreign possessions located outside of the United
States for constitutional purposes. 15 United States policymakers sought to
develop a new tradition of territorial expansionism that was not bound to
past precedents and that would be flexible to the local needs of the U.S.
military.
The United States military occupied Puerto Rico on July 25, 1898 and
imposed a two-year military dictatorship to prepare the island’s local
institutions for U.S. rule. 16 In his final report as governor of Puerto Rico,
Brigadier-General Davis, the last military governor of the island,
summarized the military’s role in shaping the new territorial status within
the emerging U.S. empire:
The scope of these orders was very wide. Almost every
branch of administration-political, civil, financial, and
judicial-was affected by their provisions. It may be that
the military governors exceeded their authority when they
changed the codes, the provisions of which were not in
conflict with the political character, institutions, and
Constitution of the United States; but in the absence of
instructions to the contrary, it was conceived to be the
privilege and duty of the military commanders to make
use of such means with a view to adapting the system of
local laws and administration to the one which, judging
from precedents, Congress might be expected to enact for
the island, thus preparing the latter for a territorial régime
when Congress should be ready to authorize it. It has been
pointed out that the course adopted is understood to have
been, tacitly at least, approved by Congress, for with two
slight exceptions, specified in the (Foraker Act of 1900),
every order promulgated by the military governors has
been confirmed by Congressional enactment, has become
part of the supreme law of the land, and will so remain

See Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. 317, 319 (1829) (holding that the United States
federal government has the power to impose a direct tax on the District of Columbia).
15
See Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603, 615 (1850).
16
See JOSÉ TRÍAS MONGE, EL CHOQUE DE DOS CULTURALS JURIDICAS EN PUERTO RICO,
EL CASE DE LA RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL EXTRACONTRACTUAL (Orford, N.H; Equity P.B.,
1st ed. 1991); see also Report of the Military Governor of Porto Rico on Civil Affairs, H.R.
DOC. No. 56-2, at 101 (1902).
14
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until abrogated or changed by Congress or by the
legislative assembly of the island (emphasis added). 17
The United States formally annexed Puerto Rico on December 10,
1898, amidst the occupation and under the terms of the Treaty of Paris. 18
United States military governors continued to rule Puerto Rico until 1900,
when Congress created a civil government for the island under the terms
of the Foraker Act. 19
In addition to creating a civil government for Puerto Rico, the Foraker
Act contained a provision that treated Puerto Rico as a foreign territorial
possession. Specifically, Section 3 extended the so-called Dingley Tariff
of 1897 20 to the island imposing a 15% tariff on merchandize trafficked
between Puerto Rico and the mainland. 21 The tariff treated an annexed
territory as a foreign possession that belonged to, but was not a part of the
United States. On April 2, 1900, during the debates over the Foraker Act,
Senator John C. Spooner (R-WI) summarized the logic informing the new
territorial status in the following passage:
I will not quibble about words. Territory belonging to the
United States, as I think Puerto Rico and the Philippine
Archipelago do, become a part of the United States in the
international sense, while not being at all a part of the
United States in the constitutional sense. 22
Less than a year later, the Supreme Court began to affirm the new
insular or territorial law and policy in a series of rulings generally known
as the Insular Cases of 1901. 23 Specifically, the core principles of the
ensuing constitutional interpretation were established in Justice Edward
D. White’s concurring opinion in Downes v. Bidwell. 24 Justice White
began by rejecting the prevailing colonialist 25 and imperialist 26
interpretations and adopted a third view, which has since been described
Trías Monge, supra note 14 at 47.
Treaty of Paris, Sp.-U.S., Dec 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754.
19
See generally Foraker Act of 1900, ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77 (1900).
20
See Dingley Act of 1897, ch.11, 30 Stat. 151 (1897).
21
Foraker Act of 1900, ch.191, §3, 31 Stat. 77, 77-78 (1900).
22
33 CONG. REC. 3608, 3629 (1900) (statement of Sen. Wallop).
23
See generally Juan R. Torruella, The Supreme Court and Puerto Rico: The Doctrine
of Separate and Unequal, 100 HARV. L. REV. 450 (1988); Christina Duffy Burnett, United
States: American Expansion and Territorial Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797 (2005);
EFRÉN RIVERA RAMOS, AMERICAN COLONIALISM IN PUERTO RICO: THE JUDICIAL AND SOCIAL
LEGACY (First Markus Wiener Publishers 2nd ed. 2007).
24
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901).
25
Id. at 340.
26
Id. at 290.
17
18
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as the doctrine of territorial incorporation. Central to Justice White’s
interpretation were several key principles. First, Justice White argued,
“Congress in legislating for Porto Rico [sic] was only empowered to act
within the Constitution and subject to its applicable limitations, and that
every provision of the Constitution which applied to a country situated as
was that island, was potential in Puerto Rico.” 27 Congress, he further
argued, possessed the power to determine what constitutional provisions
were applicable in Puerto Rico. So long as the United States recognized
the application of fundamental, albeit undefined, rights, Congress
possessed the power to enact legislation that extended or withheld
applicable constitutional provisions. Second, Justice White began to
describe Puerto Rico as an unincorporated territory, that is a territory that
is not meant to become a state of the Union and one that can be selectively
ruled as a foreign territorial possession in a domestic or constitutional
sense. 28 Underlying Justice White’s interpretation was a disdain for the
non-white inhabitants of Puerto Rico and the other newly annexed
unincorporated territories. The ensuing constitutional doctrine of
territorial incorporation that grew out of Justice White’s interpretation
affirmed the separate and unequal status of Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans
within the nascent U.S. global empire.

V. PUERTO RICO’S CITIZENSHIP LEGISLATION
Since the United States annexed Puerto Rico, Congress has debated
and enacted a wide array of bills and laws conferring three different types
of citizenship on Puerto Ricans. In 1899, the U.S. Senate ratified one
annexation treaty with a special citizenship provision. 29 Between 1898 and
1952, Congress enacted eleven laws or statutes containing citizenship
provisions for Puerto Rico. 30 Since 1898 and the time of this writing,
however, Congress debated upwards of 100 bills containing citizenship
Id. at 293.
Id. at 341-342.
29
Treaty of Paris, art. IX, Sp-U.S., Dec 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754.
30
Foraker Act of 1900, ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77, §7 (1900); Bureau of Immigration and
Naturalization Act of 1906 (“BINA”), Pub. L. No. 59-338, 34 Stat. 596 §30 (1906); Naval
Service Appropriations Act of 1914 (“NSAA”), Pub, L. No. 63-121, ch. 130, 38 Stat. 392
(1914); Jones Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-368, 39 Stat. 951, §5 (1917); Naturalization of
Resident Aliens of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-144, 40 Stat. 542 (1918); Porto Rico Civil
Revenues Act of 1927 (§5a), Pub. L. No. 69-797, 44 Stat. 1418 (1927); Puerto Rico Civil
Government Act of 1934 (§5b), Pub. L. No. 73-477, 48 Stat. 1245 (1934); Puerto Rico
Civil Government Act of 1938 (§5c), Pub. L. No. 75-521, 52 Stat. 377 (1938); Nationality
Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, 54 Stat. 1137, §§201(a), 202 (1940); To Amend the
Organic Act of Puerto Rico, Pub. L. No. 80-776, 62 Stat. 1015 (1948); Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 (“INA of 1952”), Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, §302 (1952).
27
28
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provisions for Puerto Rico. 31 Overtime, Congress extended three different
types of citizenship to Puerto Rico, namely a Puerto Rican citizenship
(1899-1934), a naturalized (individual and collective) citizenship (19061940), and birthright or jus soli citizenship (1940 to the present). 32
Following the U.S. annexation of Puerto Rico in 1898, Congress
invented local nationalities or “citizenships” to govern the inhabitants of
Puerto Rico and the other unincorporated territories. 33 In the case of Puerto
Rico, the Treaty of Paris of 1898, the treaty providing for the U.S.
annexation of Puerto Rico, contained a provision treating the insular or
island-born inhabitants of the newly annexed territory as local or Puerto
Rican nationals rather than U.S. citizens. More importantly, unlike
peninsular (Spain)-born residents of Puerto Rico, insular-born Spanish
citizens residing in the island were barred from either retaining their
Spanish citizenship or acquiring a U.S. citizenship. The second clause of
Article IX established that Congress could subsequently enact legislation
extending the civil and political rights to the island’s inhabitants.34 The
subsequently enacted Foraker Act of 1900 used the notion of Puerto Rican
citizenship to codify the local nationality invented by the Treaty of Paris. 35
Yet, because the Foraker Act did not change Puerto Rico’s territorial
status, birth in the island was tantamount to birth outside of the United
States for citizenship purposes. Under the prevailing naturalization
process, petitioners were required to renounce their allegiance to a
sovereign before they could naturalize. Puerto Rican citizens were unable
to comply with this requirement, namely, to renounce their allegiance to
the United States in order to undergo a naturalization process to acquire a
U.S. citizenship! Puerto Rican citizens were governed under the racist
doctrine of separate and unequal, included within the polity, but barred
from equal membership within the Anglo-American polity.
However, in 1906 federal lawmakers agreed to grant Puerto Ricans
the ability to acquire a U.S. citizenship via naturalization. Starting with the
Bureau of Naturalization Act of 1906 (BINA), Congress began to enact
legislation creating special waivers enabling individual Puerto Ricans to
travel to the mainland or an incorporated territory and undergo the
31
For original copies of all bills containing citizenship provisions for Puerto Rico
debated in Congress since 1898 see Puerto Rico Citizenship Archives Project,
ScholarsCollaborative.org, http://scholarscollaborative.org/PuertoRico/ (last visited Dec.
31, 2017).
32
See generally Charles R. Venator-Santiago, Mapping the Contours of the History of
the Extension of U.S. Citizenship to Puerto Rico, 1898-Present, 29 CENTRO J. 38, 38-55
(2017) (for a more substantive overview of this history)
33
Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Spain, art. IX, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754, at 1759.
34
Id.
35
Foraker Act of 1900, §7, 31 Stat. 77, at 79.
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prevailing naturalization process. 36 The BINA was subsequently amended
in 1914 and 1918 creating additional waivers for Puerto Ricans to
naturalize. 37 In 1917 Congress began to enact legislation providing for the
collective naturalization of the residents of Puerto Rico. Section 5 of the
Jones Act of 1917 established simple condition permitting Puerto Rican
citizens residing in Puerto Rico to choose to retain their status quo or do
nothing and acquire a U.S. citizenship by not doing anything. Aliens and
alien children residing in Puerto Rico were allowed to undergo a simple
administrative procedure to naturalize under the terms of Section 5. 38 The
citizenship provision of the Jones Act was subsequently amendment in
1927, 1934, 1938, 1940, and 1948. 39 Again, because the Jones Act did not
contain a provision that incorporated Puerto Rico or implicitly changed its
territorial status, birth in Puerto Rico was tantamount to birth outside of
the United States for citizenship purposes. This meant that persons born in
Puerto Rico under the terms of the Jones Act, and its subsequent
amendments, could only acquire a derivative form of jus sanguinis (blood
right) citizenship, or a naturalized citizenship status.
In 1940, Congress began to enact citizenship legislation extending
birthright or jus soli citizenship to Puerto Rico. The Nationality Act of
1940 began by treating Puerto Rico as a part of the United States for sole
purposes of extending birthright citizenship to the island. 40 In addition,
drawing on the Citizenship Clause of the 14th Amendment, the Nationality
Act included a provision explicitly extending birthright or jus soli
citizenship to the island. 41 Congress subsequently affirmed the citizenship
provisions for Puerto Rico in 1948 and 1952. 42 To be sure, all persons born
in Puerto Rico after January 13, 1941, the date of the law’s enactment, are
born in the United States for the purpose of acquiring a birthright or
“native-born” citizenship status. Yet, it is important to emphasize that
while the Nationality Act of 1940, and its subsequent iterations, treated
Puerto Rico as a part of the United States for the purpose of extending
birthright citizenship to the island, it did not explicitly incorporate or
36
Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1906 (BINA), §30, 34 Stat. 596, at
606-607.
37
See id.
38
Jones Act of 1917, §5, 39 Stat. 951, at 953.
39
See id.
40
Nationality Act of 1940, §101(d), 54 Stat. 1137.
41
Id. §201(a), 54 Stat. 1137, at 1138. For a description of the legislative background and
intent of each provision, see U.S. COMM. TO REVIEW THE NATIONALITY LAWS,
76TH CONG., REP. ON NATIONALITY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (hereafter
President’s Committee Report), Part 1, v (Comm. Print 1938).
42
To Amend the Organic Act of Puerto Rico, Pub. L. No. 80-776, 62 Stat. 1015 (1948);
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (“INA of 1952”), Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat.
163, §302 (1952).
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change Puerto Rico’s territorial status. These laws merely treat Puerto
Rico as an incorporated territory for the sole purpose of extending
birthright citizenship to the island.
In sum, I want to emphasize several important points. First, since
annexing Puerto Rico, Congress has extended different types of
citizenship to Puerto Rico without changing the island’s territorial or
rather constitutional status. Second, whereas Congress treated island-born
Puerto Ricans who acquired a U.S. citizenship prior to 1940 as naturalized
citizens, those born after the enactment of the Nationality Act of 1940 were
treated as native-born citizens. While it true that some of the citizenship
legislation for Puerto Rico retroactively extended a birthright citizenship
status to persons born in Puerto Rico after the ratification of the Treaty of
Paris on 1899, it is important to recognize that Congress treated Puerto
Rican-born citizens as naturalized rather than native-born citizens.

VI. INTEREST CONVERGENCE AND THE EXTENSION OF U.S.
CITIZENSHIP TO PUERTO RICO
The legislative history of the federal status legislation for Puerto Rico
and citizenship statutes for Puerto Ricans are replete with racist
commentary. Historically, federal law and policymakers invoked racist
narratives of Anglo-Saxon exceptionalism to legitimate the separate and
unequal status of the Puerto Rican territory and its inhabitants.43 The
question is: why would racist federal lawmakers agree to grant citizenship
to racially inferior Puerto Ricans living in an unincorporated territory?
Legislative reports informing the debates over the BINA of 1906, the first
statute granting Puerto Ricans U.S. citizenship, as well as the legislative
histories of bills leading to the enactment of the Jones Act of 1917,
demonstrate that Bell’s notion of interest convergence can explain why
even racist white elites ultimately supported enabling Puerto Ricans to
acquire U.S. citizenship.
As noted above, one of the dimensions of interest convergence is a
concern with the public image of the U.S. government in international
forums. United States law and policymakers are interested in fostering an
international representation of the U.S. as a just nation were all “men” are
treated equally. In a 1906 Senate Report accompanying S. 2620, a
See for example Rubin Francis Weston, RACISM IN U.S. IMPERIALISM, THE
INFLUENCE OF RACIAL ASSUMPTION ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 18931946 (1972). It is important to note that at least one federal district court declared that the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Gonzalez v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1 (1904) established that Puerto
Ricans were racially eligible to naturalize and acquire a U.S. citizenship under the terms of
the BINA of 1906. See In re Giralde, 226 F. 826 (1915).
43
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citizenship bill for Puerto Rico, Senator Joseph B. Foraker (R-OH), also a
supporter of the extension of citizenship to Puerto Rico, included several
letters he had received from President Theodore Roosevelt supporting the
collective naturalization of Puerto Ricans. In a letter sent to Senator
Foraker on March 26, 1906, President Roosevelt wrote:
My dear Senator Foraker: As you know, Mr. Larrinaga
has been appointed as one of the American delegates to
the Pan-American Congress in Brazil. It would be a real
misfortune not to have the citizenship bill for Porto Rico
[sic] pass at this session, prior to his going there. I cannot
believe there will be any opposition to the bill and I most
earnestly hope that it will be put through as speedily as
possible. I know how heartily you sympathize [sic] with
it. 44
The fact Congress had not granted citizenship to Puerto Ricans
reaffirmed the perception that the United States was an empire holding a
colony of subjects who shared a Spanish heritage with Latin Americans.
United States efforts to enforce President Roosevelt’s “big stick” policy
and to demand more democratic reforms in Latin America were ultimately
undermined by the perception that the U.S. was an empire with double
standards.
White were also concerned with domestic dimensions of extending
citizenship to Puerto Ricans. Opponents of granting citizenship to Puerto
Rican feared that citizenship would enable racially inferior Puerto Ricans
to vote, influence government and even demand statehood for the island.
They were concerned that Puerto Ricans could use their potential
citizenship to challenge their separate and unequal status. In contrasts,
other white elites saw the granting of citizenship as a sort of psychological
appeasement of Puerto Ricans. To be sure, in an accompanying Senate
Report supporting H.R. 20048, a 1913 version of what became the Jones
Act of 1917, Senator Miles (R-WA) argued:
On the contrary, emphasis should be laid upon the fact
that the grant of citizenship to those described in the bill
does not in any way involve the right of suffrage nor
implicate directly or indirectly the question of statehood.
Citizenship will give them certain personal legal rights
44
UNITED STATES SENATE COMM. ON PACIFIC ISLANDS AND PORTO RICO,
INHABITANTS OF PORTO RICO TO BE CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES, S.
Rep. No. 59-2746, 7 (1st Sess., 1906).
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and privileges both in their relations to the local
government and in their status abroad; will tend to
increase their self-respect and to cultivate and develop a
larger capacity for self-government. It will promote
contentment and satisfaction among the people with their
allegiance to the United States, but does not involve the
right to participate in the government nor affect in any
particular the question of statehood, any more than the
privilege of citizenship to those born within the United
States proper giver then the right of suffrage. 45
To be sure, some white elites saw the collective naturalization of
Puerto Ricans as a form of political domestication and psychological
appeasement designed to give the non-white inhabitants of the island a
greater degree of associational rights. Stated differently, citizenship would
enable white elites to include Puerto Ricans within the empire, while
simultaneously excluding them from equal membership in the polity.
White elites also believed that granting citizenship to Puerto Ricans
would help industrialize Puerto Rico and enhance their economic and
commercial interests in the island. To be sure, in a 1908 House Report
accompanying H.R. 393, Representative Henry A. Cooper (R-WI)
explained his support for the collective naturalization of Puerto Ricans by
arguing that “Porto Rico [sic] is now, and always will be, of much value
to the United States because of the island’s large business interests and
possibilities and its important and rapidly increasing trade with this
country.” 46 Representative Cooper argued that Puerto Rico had already
become a part of the United States for commercial purposes. Presumably
providing for the collective naturalization of Puerto Ricans would cement
the relationship between the island and the mainland making it easier to
invest, trade, and sustain long-term commercial endeavors in the island.
The legislative histories of the citizenship statutes for Puerto Rico
document additional reasons for granting citizenship to Puerto Ricans. For
example, again citing Representative Cooper, many white elites believe
that Puerto Rico was strategically situated to assist in the protection of the
Panama Canal.47 To this extent, citizenship could help cement the loyalty
of Puerto Ricans to the United States. The point, however, is that ample
UNITED STATES SENATE COMM. ON PACIFIC ISLANDS AND PORTO RICO,
PORTO RICAN CITIZENSHIP, S. Rep. No. 62-1300, 2 (3d Sess., 1913).
46
UNITED STATES HOUSE COMM. ON INSULAR AFFAIRS, AMERICAN
CITIZENSHIP FOR INHABITANTS OF PORTO RICO, H. Rep. No. 60-1204, 2 (1st
Sess., 1908).
47
Id.
45

2019]

THE EXTENSION OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP TO PUERTO RICO

123

evidence exists to substantiate the claim that Congress granted citizenship
to Puerto Ricans when the interests of white elites converged.
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